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only another word for Buddhism, has already been referred to [p. 86—Pfleiderer is the authority], and there can be little doubt that Western ideas of retribution and salvation, possibly Messianic, more probably Christian, are at the base of the teachings of the Mahayana system as found in China and Japan" (p. 262 f.).

That Gnosticism "is only another word for Buddhism" does not mean that Gnosticism is only Buddhism under another name, but that the author is trifling with an etymological parallel which is not parallel. As for Christian influence in Mahayana doctrine, the initial question is, Through what channel did an "essence of Christianity" reach India or China in the early centuries of our era from which everything specifically Christian had been eliminated?

One of the best things about this volume is the spirit in which it is written, and the incidental counsels to those who expect to be missionaries among the Chinese are as admirable in temper as they are wise in substance. The book may be commended not only to future missionaries and those particularly interested in missions, but to general readers, as the clearest and most comprehensive popular presentation of the subject that has appeared.

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THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON. ÉDOUARD LEROY. Translated from the French by VINCENT BENSON, M.A. Henry Holt & Co. 1913. Pp. x, 235. \$1.25.

BERGSON AND THE MODERN SPIRIT: An Essay in Constructive Thought. GEORGE ROWLAND DODSON, Ph.D. American Unitarian Association, Boston. 1913. Pp. vi, 304. \$1.35.

M. LeRoy writes with the enthusiasm of a disciple, and at the same time with the conviction and mastery of one who has thought things out for himself. "It is after cool consideration," he says, "with full consciousness of the exact value of words, that we are able to pronounce the revolution which it [Bergson's work] effects equal in importance with that effected by Kant, or even by Socrates" (pp. 1-2). But he remarks in the Preface that he has not had the honor of being Bergson's pupil, and that when he became acquainted with Bergson's philosophy his own direct reflection had already produced in him similar trains of thought. The Preface contains also Bergson's acknowledgment of the author's "deep sympathy of thought" and "power of rethinking the subject in a personal and original manner" (p. vi). M. LeRoy is un-

doubtedly peculiarly qualified to expound the quintessence of Bergsonism, and this he has successfully accomplished in the present volume. It is to be recommended to any reader who requires a condensed and summary statement of the matter made with a persuasiveness which is exceeded only by the original texts themselves.

It becomes increasingly apparent that there is one crucial question which is decisive for the truth or falsity of the Bergsonian philosophy. Is there or is there not a clear and trustworthy experience in which a something that may be called process, change, activity, life, creation, continuity, or real time, is revealed as an unanalyzable datum? Those who oppose Bergson will be those who either find nothing of the sort, or always find some peculiar complex or manifold of different items in the context to which they are referred. Those who support Bergson must appeal to a unique experience, in which differences are somehow both given and not given: given because they may be explicated by analysis and are virtually referred to whenever the experience is described; not given because they are somehow coalesced or melted into one another. If this paradox is examined by logical methods, the opponent of Bergson must be successful. If, on the other hand, the advocate of Bergson appeals to an illumination which is more authoritative than logic, he withdraws the matter from discussion and retires into a conviction which will be undisturbed because it is wholly private. "The revelation," says M. LeRoy, "is overpowering, and once vouchsafed will never afterwards be forgotten." Never, perhaps, by M. LeRoy, or by any individual for whom the revelation was a profound personal experience; but in the annals of the impersonal enterprise of knowledge it will, I venture to say, never find a place.

There is nothing essentially incorrect in appealing to intuition; for if by this one means a direct inspection of matters under discussion or the peculiar importance attaching to perception as contrasted with discursive thought, it is the fundamental thesis of all empiricism. But Bergson's method is radical and, as I think, vicious, in that he attaches cognitive priority to the sort of immediacy that precedes analysis or that may be recovered only by forgetting analysis. It is to impute oracular validity to that "first fine careless rapture" which precedes the serious effort to know. To know immediately is at least to exercise attention and discrimination, and to discover complexity where experience at first blush was confused or chaotic. "*Absolute* knowledge is found to be the result of *inte-*

gral experience" (p. 35). But the central fallacy of Bergsonism is to suppose that when we first experience that which upon further examination turns out to be multiple or infinite, we somehow experience all that such later examination could reveal. "We are aware of the elementary disturbances which constitute matter in the perceptible quality in which they suffer contraction, as we are aware of the beating of our heart in the general feeling that we have of living" (p. 35). But we are not aware of the beating of our heart until discrimination has emphasized it, brought it into view. Nor is it possible to envisage the totality of such discriminable aspects in any single immediate experience. Either they are ignored altogether, as is the case with ordinary unsophisticated experience, or they must be described in the summaries and formulas of science.

Dr. Dodson lays stress on the relations of Bergson to his contemporaries, and on the ethical and religious implications of his philosophy. As respects the first question, one may properly take exception to his references to William James. The statement that "the American philosopher follows the Frenchman in his theory, we may even say his demonstration, of the impossibility of knowing the fullness and richness of life through conceptual thought" (p. 222) is, to say the least, misleading, in view of the contents of James's *Reflex Action and Theism*, published in 1881. What the author means by saying that James "frankly admitted the valid criticisms offered against his original theory of pragmatism, and made so many concessions that practically nothing was left of it at last except the part of it that argument can never reach"—passes comprehension. Again, the author appears to believe that, according to James, "if we are to know the true from the false, there must be some reference to a reality outside our experience" (p. 212). I say "appears to believe," because in another passage (p. 207) the author expresses himself ambiguously. In any case he ignores James's conception of an experiential reality as this is set forth in the *Essays on Radical Empiricism*. The whole discussion of James, as well, I should say, as of Dewey, is careless and inadequate.

The question of the ethical and religious implications of Bergson's philosophy is, I suppose, inevitable, although I suspect that Bergson himself would be the first to condemn it as premature. As the question is discussed in the present volume, little more is accomplished than to show that Bergson does prove morally and spiritually stimulating to Dr. Dodson, and otherwise to bring to light the limitations and internal difficulties of Bergson's system as thus far set forth. We are told that ethical and religious beliefs may turn

out to be "primary instincts," and so to possess an authoritative-ness above that of the intellect which would discredit them (pp. 133-134). This might be the case if morality and religion were instinctive—and there is every reason to believe that they are not—or if instincts were beliefs which could be either true or false. The proposal to establish beliefs by claiming that they are in some loose sense "instinctive," can only prove that Bergsonism lends comfort to obscurantism through its limited but ill-guarded treatment of "instinct" as cognitive. As for the more fundamental question of the "purposiveness" of the world, Dr. Dodson finds it necessary to dissent from Bergson, and succeeds only in showing the opposition in Bergson of two notions, that of sheer impetus or *vis a tergo*, and that of direction, growth, or realization; and the further opposition between the unity of life and the extreme diversity of its fortunes. If Bergsonism means only that man and nature are continuous, or that man may be taken to be a product of nature by which nature herself may be judged, Bergsonism enjoys no religious advantage over any other evolutionary philosophy. If one requires a guarantee that nature is progressively dominated by life of the human sort, and that things are sure to move and move consistently in this direction, one will not find it in Bergson's philosophy. On the contrary, one will find that the somewhat sporadic and exceptional character of human life, and the essentially spontaneous and unpredictable character of all life, both argue against it.

M. LeRoy is on safer ground when he protests against estimating the ethical and religious possibilities of Bergson in terms of his present thought. It is characteristic of Bergson to take up one problem at a time, and it is also characteristic that each new book reveals something essentially new and unexpected. Hence though we must wait, we have good ground for hope. Though we may be confident that there will be a Bergsonian ethics or religion, it would scarcely be Bergsonian if we could predict it in advance.

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SCHLEIERMACHER: A Critical and Historical Study. W. B. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. E. P. Dutton & Co. 1913. Pp. ix, 272.

The announcement of a new work on Schleiermacher in English raises great expectations; all the more when the one who undertakes it is the Principal of Mansfield College. No book could be